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Abstract: 
 
Reports on supply chains as major sources of cybersecurity threats. Companies and organizations 
increasingly share data, credentials, software code, applications, networks, and infrastructures 
with “trusted” supply chain partners. Supply chains can be sources of cybervulnerabilities. One 
estimate has suggested that supply chains account for 80% of all cyber breaches. Insecure supply 
chains have fostered well-known cyberattacks. In a quest to break large organizations' networks, 
cyber-criminals may look beyond the first-tier supply chain partners. 
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Article: 
 
Organizations increasingly share data, credentials, software code, applications, networks, and 
infrastructures with “trusted” supply chain partners. Supply chains can be sources of cyber- 
vulnerabilities. One estimate has suggested that supply chains account for 80% of all cyber 
breaches (https://www.industryweek.com/supply-chain/can-t-turn-back-time-cybersecurity-must-
be-dealt). Insecure supply chains have fostered well-known cyberattacks. 
 
In a quest to break large organizations’ networks, cyber-criminals may look beyond the first-tier 
supply chain partners. According to Accenture’s Cyber Threatscape Report (2018), hackers have 
an increased focus on exploiting third- and fourth-party supply chain partners to infiltrate large 
organizations.1 Another trend has been attacks on hardware products via backdoors and with 
malware insertion.2 
 
VULNERABILITIES AND EXPLOITS 
 
Supply chains are vulnerable and subject to exploitation. Table 1 provides examples. 
 
Consider software development. By attacking smaller software providers, hackers have been able 
to infiltrate larger organizations that rely on software. For example, in a British Airways (BA) 
case, hackers attacked third-party code that ran payment authorization by injecting their own 
malicious code into it. This meant that the hackers did not need to access or penetrate BA 
networks.4 The hackers also obtained CVV numbers, however BA reported that it had not stored 
the CVV numbers. This suggests that the CVV numbers were intercepted when transactions 
occurred (https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-45440850). According to the cyber 
security company RiskIQ, the BA hackers employed a “cross-site scripting” attack. In such 
attacks, criminals exploit a third-party website to launch cyberattacks against other entities. 
Nation-states can also exploit supply chains for spying. For example, according to the cyber-
security company Area 1, several nations may have collaborated to launch a cyberattack on 4the 
Saudi oil company Aramco in 2017 (https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/21/cyber-attack-targets-
safety-system-at-saudi-aramco/).  
 
Table 1. Examples of cyberattacks involving supply chain partners 
Organization Reported in Effect Supply chain partner compromised 
Equifax 2017 143 million people Flaws in the enterprise platform 
(https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-breach-no-excuse/) 
that collected website performance data and served 
malicious content (http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
equifax-social-security-numbers-20171012-story.html).  
Target December 2013 40 million credit 
and debit-card 
accounts and 70 
million people. 
Started with stealing credentials of Target’s HVAC vendor 
(https://www.csoonline.com/article/2601021/security0/11-
steps-attackers-took-to-crack-target.html). The hackers then 
used the stolen credentials to gain access to Target-hosted 
web services that were dedicated to vendors. 
Ticketmaster Early 2018 40 000 U.K. users Customer-service chatbot supplied by a third-party 
(https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-44642567).  
British Airways September 2018 380 000 customers Third-party software code used to run payment 
authorization. 
 
CHALLENGES 
 
Challenges exist in securing supply chains. For example, companies may assign a lower priority 
to supply chain risks than other types of risks. A survey conducted among the members of 
Consumer Packaged Goods Vertical Strategy Group revealed that while 100% of the respondents 
assessed IT risks, only 75% assessed supply chain risks. Likewise, only 75% considered 
minimizing supply chain cyber risks as a third-party risk management goal.3 Furthermore, 
although most organizations conduct annual risk assessments, those may be insufficient to deal 
with the challenges facing supply chains (https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/technology/403958-washington-to-finally-focus-on-threat-to-supply-chain-risk). Trust in 
any supply chain is a complex problem that is hard to measure and achieve. Supply chains of 
large organizations are often complicated and involve large numbers of partners and products. 
For example, one cybersecurity firm noted that one of its client’s supply chains involved more 
than 5000 companies (https://finfeed.com/small-caps/technology/british-airways-data-breach-
throws-whitehawks-us-government-contract-into-light/). Thus, it is challenging to monitor 
supply chains with so many stakeholders involved, and particularly in real-time. A survey found 
that 72% of companies lacked full visibility into their supply chains.4 
 
While the problem has been recognized since the 1970s, the severity of this issue is compounded 
by the rapid internationalization of technology and the global division of labor 
(https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/10/supply-chain-security-101-an-experts-view/). Simply 
blocking foreign companies from being dominant suppliers may not be effective. For example, 
China controls of a large proportion of the global supply chain yet offers no guarantee that their 
products have security built-in since the designs of those products may occur in other countries 
(https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/technology/the-week-in-tech-fears-of-the-supply-chain-
in-china.html).  
 
In some countries, electronic components produced in those countries are sold by various “white 
label” firms. If security flaws are identified in components that were “white labeled,” it may be 
difficult to know which companies white-labelled a specific component, and it will be difficult to 
inform consumers about these flaws. In another scenario, when a security hole is found in a 
specific vendor product, that vendor may simply go out of business and restart under a different 
name (https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/10/supply-chain-security-is-the-whole-enchilada-but-
whos-willing-to-pay-for-it/). And when white-labeling occurs, the original manufacturer may 
have little incentive to increase trust in their products beyond what the rebranding companies 
require.  
 
Another problem is related to the lack of regulatory and enforcement mechanisms. Some 
government methods for monitoring supply chain trust focus more on preventing counterfeit 
products than on espionage activities (https://www.techrepublic.com/article/5-tips-to-secure-
your-supply-chain-from-cyberattacks/).  
 
And finally, consumers are often more interested in price and functionality. Increased security 
often makes devices slower and more expensive. Moreover, security flaws may not directly 
affect device owners but affect others. Even if owners know that their devices are being used to 
launch cyberattacks, the end-victims are often unknown. Manufacturers have few incentives to 
make securer devices until customers demand it. 
 
POSSIBLE APPROACHES 
 
Table 2 presents four potential avenues for enhancing supply chain security and trust. 
 
Governments 
 
Regulatory measures are one approach intended to increase supply chain trust. Efforts to do this 
have already been undertaken. In September 2018, the Trump Administration released a National 
Cybersecurity Strategy that requires federal agencies to invest in more secure supply chain 
technologies (Feldman, 2018).5 
 
There have also been attempts to introduce formal legislation to increase trust in supply chains. 
In September 2018, the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 
approved the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act. The Act is intended to improve 
information sharing within the intelligence community. It also establishes an inter-agency 
process to exclude companies from contracting with the federal government if it deemed that 
they may pose threats to the federal supply chain.6 
 
Table 2. Possible measures at various levels to secure supply chains 
Level Mechanisms Examples/Remarks 
National/state Increasing investment in technological and 
human capabilities. Introducing formal 
legislation to secure supply chains. Increasing 
awareness of supply chain risks and providing 
guidelines to strengthen security. 
The U.S.: National Cybersecurity Strategy 
requires federal agencies to invest more in secure 
supply chain technologies. The Federal 
Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act. DHS 
guidelines that outline device manufacturers’ 
roles and obligations surrounding IoT security. 
Industry 
group/trade 
association 
Fill the regulatory vacuum. Resource and 
expertise advantages. 
Diverse networking, engineering, financial, 
electronics, cybersecurity, and blockchain 
businesses team to develop blockchain 
functionality to improve supply chain trust. 
Manufacturers 
and service 
providers 
Ensure that supply chain partners follow security 
standards. Continuously monitor supply chain 
cyber risks. Develop and implement new ways to 
assess and deal with supply chain risks. 
Organizations employ Cyber Risk Frameworks to 
identify risks associated with subcontractors. 
Consumers Purchasing power. Changing consumer mindset to require vendors to 
follow responsible security practices. 
 
Government agencies have also taken steps to increase awareness of supply chain risks by 
providing guidelines to strengthen security. In 2013, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) released guidelines that outline device manufacturers’ roles and obligations related to IoT 
security. DHS urged companies producing IoT products to “build security in” at the design 
phase. 
 
Government stakeholders can also consider teaming with private sector stakeholders to monitor 
vulnerabilities and share relevant information. This could lead to greater awareness and 
recognition of supply chain cyber-threats (https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/managing-
risk-in-the-energy-sector-s-cyber-supply-chain). A recent report by MITRE on securing the U.S. 
Pentagon’s cyber supply chain recommended the establishment of a National Supply Chain 
Intelligence Center. The report recommended that the Center be co-led by civilian and military 
agencies (Https://Advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5TG6-
7771-JBHM-S2HW-00000-00&context=1516831).  
 
Industry and Trade Associations 
 
Industry groups and trade associations may also be able to play a role here. 
 
One is an example of this occurred in January 2017; a group including Cisco, Bosch, Bank of 
New York Mellon, Foxconn, Dutch cybersecurity company Gemalto, and other blockchain 
startups came together to develop a team that plans to establish blockchain protocols for IoT 
devices, applications, and networks (bit.ly/2kNtm7w).  
 
Note that blockchain has the potential to strengthen supply chain trust. Blockchain can facilitate 
the handling and dealing with crisis situations such as product recalls. Blockchain’s public 
transparency offers traceability allowing for a backward trace to the origin of a final product’s 
raw materials. Furthermore, transactions recorded in blocks might be able to predict and identify 
the end-users of vulnerable products. 
 
The reason that blockchain holds promise here is that the blocks can register the time of 
transaction, the location of transaction, price, parties involved, and other information as an item 
changes ownership and moves through a work flow or manufacturing process. Blockchain’s 
distributed ledger technology can also track raw materials as they move through a supply chain 
over time. Blockchain can also register updates, patches, and part replacements applied to end-
products throughout their lifetime. This offers tracking of vulnerabilities and notifications for 
end-users. 
 
MANUFACTURERS AND SERVICE PROVIDERS 
 
Manufacturers and service providers can leverage their buying power to strengthen trust in 
supply chains. How? They can evaluate the security practices of supply chain partners and insist 
that applicable security standards are followed. Furthermore, compliance can sometimes be 
mandated through contracts (https://www.cbronline.com/solutions/us-organisations-not-battle-
ready-in-war-against-cybercrime-4280918/), however, determination of compliance is often 
elusive. 
 
Manufacturers and service providers may also consider developing new ways to assess and 
mitigate supply chain risks. For example, artificial intelligence and machine learning may be 
able to fight specific types of malware attacks in software supply chains. Over time, such tools 
“learn” to detect unusual patterns in various supply chain environments 
(http://www.cioandleader.com/article/2018/02/22/india-invest-heavily-ai-based-tools-counter-
cyber-attacks-cisco). IBM’s AI platform, Watson, is being used to provide predictive analytics to 
minimize disruptions and risks (https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewarnold/2018/05/26/how-
the-internet-of-things-impacts-supply-chain/).  
 
Solutions that focus on risks associated with supply chain partners, subcontractors, and vendors 
can also be employed. WhiteHawk’s 360 Risk Framework evaluates software vendors and 
service providers. The first customer of WhiteHawk’s product was a U.S.-based financial 
institution whose goal was to identify the institution’s exposure to cybersecurity risks induced by 
its 50 most important subcontractors. The identified subcontractors were expected to address 
their cyber risks (https://finfeed.com/small-caps/technology/whitehawk-wins-us325k-first-sale-
cyber-risk-product/).  
 
And finally, it may be useful to contract for the external services that will continuously monitor 
the cyber risks associated with third-party vendors (https://threatpost.com/five-weakest-links-in-
cybersecurity-that-target-the-supply-chain/137453/). Realize that if only an annual risk 
assessment is performed, security problems may be discovered too late for mitigation and after 
damage occurs. More frequent assessments should provide a fuller picture of supply chain risks 
so that more timely mitigation measures can be applied. 
 
CONSUMERS 
 
Consumer buying power can also be leveraged to strengthen supply chain trust. For instance, 
consumers could add pressure to manufacturers to incorporate security “best practices” into 
development life cycles. If consumers demanded more secure products and services, 
manufacturers might be more likely to source their components from contractors with known and 
demonstrated levels of security.  
 
An encouraging trend here involves consumer mindset. Recent surveys have suggested that 
consumers expect businesses to follow responsible security practices. According to the RSA 
Data Privacy & Security Report that was based on a survey of 7500 consumers in France, 
Germany, Italy, the UK and the U.S., 62% of the respondents said that they would blame the 
company, not the hacker, if their data is breached.7 Likewise, a survey of 1000 U.K. consumers 
commissioned by FireEye indicated that 72% of consumers would stop purchasing from a 
company if a security breach was found to be linked to the company’s failure to prioritize 
security and privacy (http://www.itproportal.com/2016/05/11/high-profile-data-breaches-
affecting-consumer-trust-in-big-brands/).  
 
SUMMARY 
 
Supply chains are increasingly vulnerable and threatened. Trust in supply chains is a difficult 
proposition. Adversaries can inject malware and other malicious defects anytime during 
manufacturing and design. And it is hard to assess trust for international supply chains.  
 
The problem of trusting supply chains is unlikely to go away soon. It is an analogous problem to 
that of drug smuggling—smugglers continue to find new ways to hide their illegal products 
during transport while law enforcement tries to catch up. So, in closing, let us revisit our title: 
Supply Chain Trust, a topic that is both timely and timeless. Is trust here possible? “Yes,” but 
with caveats, and probably many. 
 
DISCLAIMER 
 
The authors are completely responsible for the content in this paper. The opinions expressed here 
are completely their own. 
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